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Résumé 
 
Les techniques de financement de projet introduites par les partenariats public-
privé britanniques ont permis à la personne publique de bénéficier d’évaluations 
réalisées par les banques et les agences de notation financières, lesquelles l’aident 
à réduire l’asymétrie informationnelle qu’elle subit traditionnellement face à ses 
contractants. Un tel processus peut à la fois jouer ex ante, dans le cadre de la 
concurrence pour le marché, et ex post, dans la logique du maintien d’une 
concurrence dans le marché, par exemple dans une logique de concurrence par 
comparaison. 
 
Dans le cadre de la concurrence pour le marché mettre en concurrence de façon 
autonome le volet financier du contrat permet d’accroître l’information du 
contractant public quant à l’équilibre économique de l’opération. Encore s’agit-il 
de veiller à ce que les coûts additionnels induits par la procédure n’en annulent pas 
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les gains potentiels. D’autres instruments sont utilisés pour maintenir une pression 
concurrentielle sur le contractant. Il s’agit des techniques de value testing, 
lesquelles recouvrent des techniques de parangonnage (benchmarking) et de 
remise en concurrence partielle (market testing). Il ressort alors de l’expérience 
britannique que ces dispositifs ne sont pas exempts de risques pour la personne 
publique, qu’il s’agisse de coûts de transaction ou de possibilité de révision à la 
hausse des paiements de la personne publique. 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Private finance has brought to public-private partnerships a third-party overlook on 
the contracts. Bringing into the appraisal of PPP deals banks and rating agencies 
results in outsourcing the due diligence of the project to the party best suited to 
perform it. This reduction in asymmetries of information can occur both in the 
competition for the market stage or in the competition within the market stage 
(yardstick competition). 
 
At the negotiation stage, funding competition helps to increase the public sector's 
information on the deal. Of course, the cost of collecting this information should 
not overweight the savings it induces. In order to maintain competitive pressure 
through the lifecycle of the project, value testing schemes, as benchmarking or 
market testing are used. However, they induce concerns about transaction costs 
and could reduce the certainty about the charge for the public partner. 
 
 
 
 
 
Public-Private Partnership (PPP) is a general expression describing a vast array of contracts, 
ranging from finance leases to concessions. This paper deals with a peculiar type of Public-
Private Partnerships, introduced by the British Private Finance Initiative (PFI) and implemented 
in France under the Partnership Contracts framework. These contracts rely on project finance for 
their funding and provide services sold mainly to the public sector. Indeed, the development of 
PFI in United Kingdom has induced a significant transformation of the financing structure of 
government contracts. As Richard Abadie, Head of PFI Policy at HM Treasury wrote in the 
Standard & Poor’s PPP Credit Survey 2006: “Ten years ago, there was no public project finance 
business. Today, about 90% of the £46 billion already invested in PFI is project finance debt and 
I see no problem with funding capacity for our future PFI program” (Holder, 2006). Such 
contracts bring a third party in the traditional principal-agent scheme, the financier, who finances 
the most part of the project’s investment costs. Instead of a traditional Principal-Agent 
relationship, these contracts involve investors whose interests are most of the time aligned with 
those of the purchaser (Vinter, 1997) 
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In a Partnership Contract, competitive pressure could be maintained through the underlying 
specificities of the contract. Lenders play a role in disciplining the special purpose entity (SPE) in 
charge of the contract and avoiding too aggressive financial schemes, which could induce a 
significant financial vulnerability. In other words, financial investors in SPE bonds have proper 
incentives to favour the optimal levels of gearing and leverage. Weak financial coverage ratios 
would compromise their expected returns. As Abadie also wrote: “However, the government 
expects the markets to regulate themselves on appropriate gearing levels and interest rates for 
PFI” (Holder, 2006). Our purpose is to analyse the changes in governance and incentives brought 
by this framework in issues related to competition in PPP projects.  
 
The main component of the contractor costs is the repayment of the asset providing the service. 
This financing comes essentially from bank loans or in some cases from bond issues. The 
commitment and the credibility of both the bidder and its project is therefore assessed by a third 
party and its ability to get funded at the best cost is observable by the public partner (Lyonnet du 
Moutier, 2006). The asymmetry of information on the financing cost can be furthermore limited 
if a funding competition is held (NAO, 2001). The presence of a third party, the investor, allows 
other ways to reduce asymmetries of information. In order to guarantee the repayment of the 
debt by the contractor, investors will require tight governance rules for the project. As the 
operator will have to conform to debt coverage ratios, any lack of performance will not only 
result in penalties, but also in pressures from the investor. 
 
Being a global contract, the Partnership Contract leads to the creation of a consortium, as a 
single operator cannot provide the whole package of services needed. The project governance 
requires re-allocating the risks transferred to the private sector between the stakeholders 
(investors, builders, facility managers etc). This process gives way to a series of back-to-back 
contracts, designed to prevent any free riding between the parties. When the contracts 
between the members of the consortium do not match sufficiently the contract with the public 
authorities, this may lead to a project termination (NAO, 2006). PPP are global contracts, 
bundling design, building and operation of an asset (infrastructure or equipment). Their 
duration is related to the economic life cycle of the underlying asset. Both characteristics tend 
to restrain competition, as they favour large firms during both the tendering process and in 
further renegotiations (Hart and Moore, 1988). 
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In such franchise contract model, the contractor is free from competitive pressure. The solution 
for creating proper incentives to efficiency lies in setting up a competition for the market 
(Demsetz, 1968). Competition for the market could be, to a certain extent, analysed as a decisive 
step for the quality of incentives in a PPP contract, according to the Chaldwick’s principle (1859) 
rediscovered by Demsetz (Mougeot and Naegelen, 2007). However, competition for the market 
within a framework of incomplete contracts creates specific issues (Williamson, 1976; Huet, 
2006). Being a long term and global contract, the partnership contract enhances the traditional 
issues of moral hazard and adverse selection related to the choice of a bidder. It implies high 
transaction costs for both the public and private partners, due to duration of the negotiation and 
the skills and resources involved (Allen, 2003). The requirements of the contract are generally 
complex and expressed in terms of outputs rather than inputs. Each bidder must present an 
innovative offer, with the underlying risk of losing the tender without being repaid for its 
innovation. Both of these characteristics tend to limit the number of bidders and in the long term 
reduce the competition, as most firms would get out of the PPP market after a costly series of 
lost bids 
 
The ability of a Public Private Partnership to maintain the competitive pressure ex post must also 
be questioned (Chong, Huet, Saussier and Steiner, 2007). If they were no asymmetries of 
information, a simple cost plus contract would be optimal. A fixed price contract would owe a 
rent to the private partner. In both cases, it remains difficult or very costly to identify the type of 
bidder and to measure its performance (Laffont and Tirole, 1986). Furthermore, the contractor 
benefits from the contractual irreversibility and the informational rent built up during the 
contract duration. An intermediate solution would be to implement an incentive framework, with 
a less than negligible risk of leaving the contractor a substantial rent (Laffont and Tirole, 1993). 
 
Asymmetries of information on the operating costs can also be reduced through benchmarking 
and market testing processes (yardstick competition). Elementary parts of the service provided by 
the contractor can be periodically compared with market prices (Bureau and Mougeot, 2007). 
Prices exceeding the benchmark should be reduced to market prices. The operator will eventually 
choose new sub-contractors in order to reduce its costs. Such mechanisms appear particularly 
suited for soft services within PFI contracts (Farquharson, 2007). Evidences of operational PFI 
contracts reveal that public contractors regard soft services as less performing on average than 
the other components of PFI (Partnerships UK, 2006). As facility management can be unbundled 
from the main service, specific re-tendering can be set up (market testing), or relative 
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performance with other PFI deals can be compared (benchmarking) at appropriate periods of  
the PFI contract. Periodical service by service competitions could mitigate the advantages, 
induced by the fundamental transformation (Williamson, 1985), hold by the winner of the first 
competition for the market on its future challengers.  
Our purpose is to highlight the role of external finance in PPPs’ deals. Indeed, as Dewatripont 
and Legros (2005) underlines, “although PPPs are called in UK Private Finance Initiative, the 
financial dimension of contracting has – somewhat surprising – been missing”. The fact that PFI 
contracts rely on private sector finance could be first analysed in terms of fiscal strategy (Marty, 
2007). As Dewatripont and Legros wrote “PPPs could be seen as attractive for governments, 
which try to make their accounts good by (ab)using accounting rules that not correctly capture 
their assets and liabilities”. But accounting international standards, European rules on national 
accounts and budgeting procedures tend to restrict the scope of such strategies of creative 
accounting. Thus, in the end, private finance could be analysed as a means to assess and monitor 
the financial equilibrium of the contract. As such, external finance may help the public sector in 
containing adverse selection and moral hazard issues in PPPs contracts. 
 
In this communication, our purpose is to assess to what extent separated competitions for the 
funding and value testing for facility management components are likely to incentivise private 
contractors in a framework of contractual incompleteness. To this end, we will consider in a first 
part the ability of a unbundled debt funding competition to improve competition for the market 
and to help public authorities in controlling the opportunistic behaviour of contractor. In this 
framework, we will successively analyse the role of financiers in PFI tendering process and the 
principles of the funding competitions implemented for some contracts. In our second part, we 
will show how the financier’s commitment could help to maintain competition within the 
contract and, consequently, reduce moral hazard issues. We will show, in the first place, that 
financiers and the public partner have convergent interests in the SPE financial governance. In 
the second place, we will study the contractual mechanisms that can maintain an appropriate 
competition level within the contract. 
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1 - FUNDING COMPETITION AS A MEANS TO IMPROVE COMPETITION FOR THE MARKET AND TO 
REDUCE ADVERSE SELECTION 
 
 
As principal-agent models or incomplete contract theory shows, public contractor faces 
incentives issues in PPP contracts. The contract monitoring is made more difficult because the 
output cannot be easily defined and controlled (Hart and al., 1997). The contract between the 
public principal and its private agent is incomplete because of uncertainty about the future, 
bounded rationality of both contractors and the inability to perfectly observe the agent’s 
behaviour. If as Jean Tirole (2007) quotes, contracts are never too long or too detailed in 
mainstream theory. Establishing the most complete contracts possible induces excessive 
transaction costs, wasteful investments and additional risk factors. Actually as Hirshleifer (1971) 
shown, “individual interests lead parties to fine-tune the contract whenever contract 
incompleteness could put them in a situation of being held up ex post. Completing contract thus 
involves rent-seeking” (Tirole, 2007). Trying to complete the contract in order to specify the 
obligations of both parties appears as a deadlock. 
 
These issues are prominent in long-term contracts with a significant service component. If the 
allocation of residual rights of control usually appears as a key dimension to produce efficiency 
incentives, the fear of hold-up strategies or opportunistic behaviours could arouse difficulties 
between the contractors. For example, the allocation of the different risks of a project between 
partners is particularly complicated to perform (Välilä, 2005). For example, risk transfer to private 
partner can be excessive, if he is not able to manage it at the lower cost. This may lead either to a 
non-sustainable project or to a bail out of the private partner. Introducing financier as a third 
party allows for assessing the optimality of the risk allocation.  
 
Financiers help reducing the government’s informational deficit and favour a contractual 
equilibrium between the partners, because they have proper incentives to acquire information 
about the contract. The financial and technical viability of the SPE and its ability to repay debt 
are crucial for investors. They have thus strong incentives to control the ability of the SPE to 
deliver the service required by the contract. They will have also interest in rejecting financial 
arrangements exposing the SPE to excessive hazards or deductions. As external lenders have 
incentives to invest for acquiring information about the SPE, they help the government in the 
private partner monitoring, as we will establish in this section. 
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 A - The role of financiers in PPP tendering process 
 
• Private finance as a main feature of PPP contracts 
 
The Private Finance Initiative introduced within the public contract financing the model of the 
project finance. In this framework, the actors involved are quite different from those of the 
French model of concession. It is not a bilateral relationship between a principal (the franchiser) 
and an agent (the franchisee), but a contract between a public authority and a Special Purpose 
Entity, in which the sponsors hold a very tight part. For example, the PFI contract on the 
Treasury building (see below)  presents a financing structure in which the sponsors bring just 5% 
of the funds. The SPE is also the borrower (or the bond issuer). Its cash flows must cover its 
debt service and ensure a reasonable rate of return to equity investors. In the conventional 
project finance model, the sponsors appoint a credit arranger in order to raise funds (Mireur, 
2007). Its selection takes place very early in the project life. The sponsors contract with an 
arranger before bidding. Its selection is made on the basis of previous references, reputation or 
financial capacity. This last point is one of the most important as long as the credit arranger 
brings often 30 % of the financing. The SPE and the arranger sign a term sheet which specifies 
the credit conditions and the procedure adopted for the syndication. The level of commitment of 
a credit arranger is very variable according its risk assessment. A clause of best efforts represents 
the lowest level. An unconditional offer is the highest level of commitment. If the arranger would 
fail in raising funds, he commits himself to buy the bond issued by the SPE. He plays in this 
situation a role of bond underwriter. 
 
For constituting the syndication he has to send to potential funders an information memorandum 
about the project. This one gives the financial model of the deal, which embeds its main features, 
as expected cash flows, cover ratios, sensitivity analysis or expected loss in case of default. It also 
summarises the borrower commitments and the guarantees from the sponsors. Potential funders 
assess the former experiences of the sponsors in similar deals (tracking record) and the durability 
of their technical and financial commitment in the SPE. Funders, who often search stable returns 
overall life of the project, verify if the sponsors’ implication will cover all the contractual period. 
They have to consider the potential consequences of a sale of their shares on the PFI secondary 
market during the contractual period. Without guarantee or liability disposals, the new 
shareholders may not have the financial or the technical capacities to face with the rising of the 
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cost and difficulties of maintenance at the end of the contract1. Funders also examine the risk 
allocation between the SPE and its subcontractors. It allows to prevent favouritism in the sub-
contractors selection and to assess their ability to face with potential deductions. With such 
informations, financial institutions engage a due diligence process in order to decide to participate 
to the pool and to set the spread (or the risk premium over the gilt)2.  
 
 
• The alignment of interests between the financier and the public partner; how can they 
reduce asymmetries of information? 
 
 
In PPPs contracts principal and agent have conflicting interests about the quality of service that 
should be achieved and about the costs that should be incurred. In addition, given the complexity 
of such contracts, audits are costly and very difficult to perform. Thus, participants have private 
information about contractual variables. This context makes more difficult to rely on a sole ex 
ante competition for ensuring that the ex ante contracting on and the ex post delivery of service will 
be optimal. The competition for large or complex projects, such as PFI, is often insufficient 
(Zupan, 1989). Consequently, ex ante competition fails to guarantee the optimal value for money, 
especially when the contract is characterised by a significant complexity and a strong uncertainty 
(Saussier and Yvrande-Billon, 2007). The oligopolistic structure of the market makes irrelevant 
the disciplining character of a competition for the market relying on an auction mechanism (Kirat 
and Marty, 2005). In such context, the public contractor can not solely consider the proposed 
price, in other words the PFI unitary charge. As Richard Abadie wrote “Government has focus 
on the underlying cost make up of the unitary charge. The need of transparency is unsurprising 
given the length of contracts and the public’s right to assure that the government is securing 
optimum value for money through PFI. Relying solely on competition to determine price is an 
outdated principle” (Holder, 2006).  
 
A separate funding competition both favours the entrance of new actors, which are susceptible to 
reinforce the competitive character of the PFI market and the partial solving of the issues 
                                                 
1 Such issue correspond to the debate on the incentives to invest at the end of a franchise contract in framework 
(Chong and Huet, 2007). 
2 We have to notice that it exists different types of funding, which are conventionally identified by their ranking in 
terms of repayment rights. Senior debt (on which funding competition could be processed) is ranked the highest. 
Mezzanine or subordinated debt would be only repaid when the senior debt is reimbursed. The riskiest form of 
funding, which then received the highest returns, is equity. It will be repaid only if the SPE has succeeding. 
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induced by the asymmetrical information context. The commitment of financial institutions into 
the contract allows, on one hand, for assessing the completion of value for money and reinforces, 
on the other hand the monitoring upon the SPE. Financial unbundling is an efficient lever arm 
for ensuring project transparency by inducing a disclosure of the contract financial key points. 
 
In some cases, an insufficient risk transfer to the contractor could be revealed by the reasonability 
of the bond spread. For example, if the public partner assumes nearly all the demand risk, it 
could be, in financial terms, something like providing to the contractor a forward contract for 
free (Välilä, 2005). The private partner has the guarantee to receive a certain level of revenue 
regardless of the actual level of demand. The logic is the same in the case of a guarantee of 
minimum revenue level. The private partner also benefits from a put option for free. If he will 
not deliver the service, its cash flows will be set at the option strike price. In both case, a funding 
competition will reveal such contractual disequilibrium. The effect will be comparable in 
symmetrical situation. If an unbearable level of risks is transferred to the private contractor, a 
separate funding competition will result in an excessive risk premium or a fruitless tendering.  
 
Taking benefit from the financial market evaluation could also allow to spot excessively risky 
strategies and to avoid the public contractor to manage the financial distress of its contractor. 
Such phenomenon is an endemic issue in auction process. Stimulating competition may be 
counterproductive if it encourages bidders to propose excessively low bids in order to maximise 
their winning chances. The private partner will be after in a tight corner because of the low level 
of the rent produced by its contract. However, if the contract is poorly specified, necessary 
renegotiations may lead to a substantial revision to the detriment of the public partner (Prager, 
1990), as witnessed in some PPP in Latin America (Marty, Trosa and Voisin, 2006).  
 
Thus, stimulating ex ante competition may be a risky strategy if the public contractor has 
difficulties to specify the desired output or to commit himself to not renegotiate few months 
after the financial close of the deal. If need be he will be exposed to pay excessive rents to an 
opportunistic contractor. In addition, if he is exposed to pay large rents ex post, he can also expect 
to pay rents ex ante if the competition for the market is not sufficient. Thus, it would be very 
fruitful for the public contractor to introduce in the deal another actor, which has interests 
convergent with him. An external financier has strong incentives to assess the financial 
equilibrium of the contract and to monitor the SPE during its performance. Such contractual 
unbundling seems to move away from the intrinsic logic of PPP, which lies in a global contract 
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(Hart, 2003). Nevertheless, it appears that if the synergies between conception, construction and 
operating stages are significant, the interest of a simultaneous arranging of the financing is less 
obvious (at the very least for “conventional” PFI projects). 
 
Dewatripont and Legros (2005) distinguish two types of external financiers, respectively outside 
shareholders and debt creditors. Their insight is to consider that the financial structure of the 
contract is not without consequence on the private partner incentives. A conventional result of 
corporate finance literature is to stress that outside debt or equity may lower incentives to exert 
effort for the contractor (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Indeed, if the bundling of construction and 
operating stages in a PPP contract creates proper incentives for the private partner (Hart, 2003), 
it appears that external finance induces the loss of a part of its rent. External finance introduces a 
new agency relationship into the contract. On one hand, it is positive of the public contractor 
because the interests of external financiers are convergent with its objective. By the way, he can 
externalise a part of the monitoring costs. But on the other hand, this new agency relationship 
could be seen as harmful for productive efficiency because the private partner must share its rent. 
We observe the conventional trade-off established by Laffont and Tirole (1993) between 
incentives for productive efficiency and informational rents. In a PPP, the benefits in terms of 
incentives to productive efficiency, induced by the bundling, could be undone because external 
shareholders end up getting too much of the effort returns. The higher is the share of external 
equity, the lesser are the incentives to improve the productive efficiency.  
 
Nevertheless, debt appears as a more efficient source of external finance (Dewatripont and 
Legros, 2005). Contrary to outside equity, the SPE has to serve a predefined payment to the 
holders, whatever is its rent. So the recourse to debt finance allows conciliating the interests of 
the public principal and of the lenders with the incentives of the consortium to exert adequate 
efforts. External finance introduces new control rights, which allows the lenders to exert a 
significant monitoring upon the SPE through corporate governance mechanisms (Aghion and 
Tirole, 1997). Such effect will be all the more plausible that external finance comes from well 
informed and incentivised financial actors, as banks or large pension funds. They take benefit, for 
monitoring tasks, from their internal expertise and have resources to invest for discovering useful 
information about the SPE. As Dewatripont and Legros (2005) quote, theoretical literature 
consider since Diamond (1984) that financial intermediation constitutes a process which allows 
to delegate monitoring. 
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 B - Principles and challenges of the funding competition 
 
In order to benefit from this monitoring and to ensure the value for money of PFI deals, 
especially when the competition for the market involves few actors, the British Treasury 
promotes the organisation of debt funding competitions. As Farquharson (2007) notes: “to 
improve further transparency of private finance within PFI projects, the Treasury will require 
debt funding competitions (post selection of preferred bidder) across all PFI procurements, 
except where the procuring authority believes that such approach will unduly increase 
procurement costs and lengthen procurement times”. We will assess, in our second point to what 
extent such additional competition is a costly option for the public authority. Before this, we 
consider, in a first point, the procedures used in UK for organising such competitions. 
 
• The British practice of funding competition (The PFI on Treasury headquarters and the 
guidance from the HM Treasury) 
 
The first British debt funding competition was organised in 2000 for a PFI contract relative to 
the Treasury building refurbishment (NAO, 2001). In May 2000, the Treasury completed a deal 
with Exchequer Partnership (EP) to refurbish and maintain its main building for a period of 35 
years. EP was in fact selected since September 1996 and the key terms of the deal was already set 
before the 1997 elections. The new government, who has re-launched the PFI policy (Marty, 
Trosa and Voisin, 2006) wished to re-assess the deal. Rather than setting up a new competition, 
the Treasury preferred reopening negotiations with EP, on the condition that the consortium will 
set up a specific competition on funding. The purpose of this arrangement was twofold. First, the 
Treasury wanted to obtain the best available price. Second, a separated competition may increase 
the transparency of the cost structure of the deal. Because of the long period elapsed between the 
appointment of EP as preferred bidder and the resumption of negotiations, the Treasury tended 
to consider the deal was no more best value for money. This intuition fuelled on the observed 
progressive decrease of the risk premium in PFI contracts as the portfolio as PFI signed-deals 
increases. 
 
Organising such a competition involves a strong co-ordination between the partners. As the 
NAO report picks out, “before embarking on the competition, the Treasury and Exchequer 
Partnership signed an agreement that detailed how the competition was to be run and set out the 
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role that all parties were to play during the competition process”. There were several reasons for 
giving to the private partner the responsibility of running the competition. First, it was up to him 
to convince financial markets about the robustness of its economic model and its credit 
worthiness. Second, the financiers must assess the risk allocation within the private sector, 
especially in terms of risk transfer agreements between the SPE and its sub-contractor. Third, the 
spirit of the contract binds the private partner to provide finance. The competition was relative to 
the senior debt, which is repaid first. Before launching the competition process, EP and its 
financial advisor (the Société Générale) requested Standard and Poor’s to provide the potential 
bidder with an indicative project rating3. In the end, 19 financial institutions submitted offers, 6 
final bidders provided detailed credit terms for the contract. The selected financier for senior 
debt was a monoline insurer, a financial firm whose activity is to wrap bonds. Such firms give the 
insurance to investors that the principal and the interests of issued bonds will be repay in timely 
manner. In this case, the Treasury considered that the debt funding competition makes the public 
authority save £13 millions, without altering the initial risk allocation. The saving related is 
assessed to 7%. 
 
In its 2001 evaluation the NAO considered the process will become frequent in PFI deals. But, 
until now, just one PFI contract was concerned by such competition. In this case, it is the FSTA 
(Future Strategic Air Tanker) PFI project. The preferred bidder (selected since 2004), which is a 
SPE led by EADS, launched in June 2007 a funding competition to raise £2 billions of financing. 
Introducing a separated competition for the debt funding represents a real innovation in the 
traditional project finance model. We have seen that in a conventional PFI deal the bidders are 
required to demonstrate at a relatively early stage that they can find sufficient financing. The 
purpose is to promote a competition at this stage. If the selection is competitive, the price would 
be lower. As NAO (2001) wrote, “funders are more likely to offer better terms if they are invited 
to bid against one another for the financing after a preferred bidder has been chosen and the 
project risk profile is defined”. Thus, the funding competition represents another procurement 
process, which takes place at the end of the main contractual negotiations. When the bidder 
makes its offer, it has to form expectations about its future financing. It belongs to the public 
authority to assess the realism of such hypothesis. It induces that the risk is larger when the 
project is novel and complex. Both contractors have less experience for such deals and, in 
addition, it is likely that financial structuring will have more influence on the contract conception 
(HMT, 2006).  
                                                 
3 It was rated “low investment grade”. The rate was satisfactory because it means that the probability of honouring 
the debt service is high. In other words, the project is not seen as speculative. 
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 Running such competition implies to comply with the rules of competitive dialogue in order to 
avoid replications of transaction costs and to create judicial risks4. As the competitive dialogue 
procedure requires that all the significant commercial issues are finalised at the final tender stage, 
it is necessary that the potential funders are well informed about the deal in order to propose well 
fitted bids. As such competition would increase transaction costs, the Treasury also proposes to 
limit the competition to a short-list of 4 or 6 potential funders. They are invited to bid for the 
total finance requirement. They must receive an information memorandum, which summaries all 
the relevant project features as contractual key terms, description of subcontractors, risk and 
financial analysis etc… Each offer is assessed on the basis of the risk premium required, on the 
acceptance of standard contract terms and risks allocation and on the ground of the financial 
structure of the proposal. This one covers capital structure (gearing level, financial ratios), risk 
margin and other fees, reserve requirements, repayment structures and hedging requirements 
(HMT, 2006).  
 
Running a debt funding competition is a more and more attractive option because of the 
development of the PFI financing market, which allows a greater fluidity within the potential 
funders and induces a decrease in risk premium. In UK, the growing popularity of PPP has paved 
the way for a more PFI mature funding market and a more efficient secondary market (Singh et 
al., 2006). The financing of PFI contract becomes attractive for financial institutions. First, as the 
contract portfolio growth, markets become increasingly educated and comfortable with such 
contracts. Second, a significant number of PFI has now reached the operational cash generating 
stage. As a consequence, PFI are seen as a stable asset class, with relatively high yields. Third, PFI 
contracts take benefit from significant secondary market liquidity. It allows the initial 
shareholders to realize grains through discrete proposals. Such investments are very attractive for 
pension funds. For them PFI appears as a low volatile investment. In addition, they can match 
their long term obligations to serve pensions to the stable income flows of the PFI deals.  
 
• The limits of funding competition (costs, constraints upon the Special purpose vehicle…) 
 
                                                 
4 Under competitive dialogue procedures, the authority may “request the participant identified as having submitted 
the most economically advantageous tender (e.g. the preferred bidder) to clarify aspects of the tender provided that 
this does not have the effect of modifying substantial aspects of the tender or of the call of tender and does not risk 
distorting competition or causing discrimination” (UK Public Contract Regulation, 2006, 18-26). 
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However, organising a specific funding competition is not a free option for the public authority. 
It induces additional risks and can result in an increase of transaction costs, which can outweight 
the potential benefits of the procedure. It is a particularly important dimension to take into 
account if the principal objective of the debt funding competition is to obtain better financial 
terms, in other words, to reduce the spread (or the risk premium). As we have seen, the 
competition is about senior debt finance. Not only such a competition induces significant 
transaction costs, but also the profit element in senior debt finance is a small component of the 
overall cost of service in PFI contracts. So before organising such competition, public contractor 
must assess if the game is worth the candle. This is why the new Treasury guidelines of 2006, 
which replace the 2002 ones, insist on the fact that such competitions should be considered 
above a threshold of £50 millions and must constitute a systematic approach, since the contract 
capital value exceed £500 millions (HM Treasury, 2006). 
 
A separate funding competition could have several adverse effects. First, the increase of the 
number of lenders could be sub-optimal.. The theory of incentives puts into relief some adervse 
effects of external finance. We have seen that having to share its rent with outside financiers, the 
SPE could select a socially sub-optimal level of effort. We have also to note that despite the 
interest in terms of monitoring of external finance, some free-riding issues could arouse if the 
outside financiers are excessively dispersed (Dewatripont and Legros, 2005). In terms of 
incentives to invest for acquiring information about the SPE, it will better to concentrate the 
financing to large bonds investors or banks. The superiority of concentrated debt finance on a 
dispersed outside equity is one of the most ancient principle of the agency theory. Since the 
seminal work of Berle and Means (1932) the fact that a shareholder who can claim 1 % of a 
project’s return has less incentives to invest in monitoring than a creditor who has rights on 20 
%, is well established. External finance could also paradoxically promote too aggressive financial 
structures just because of the auction process. If a lender wants to maximise its chances to win 
the bid, he risks accepting weak financial ratios. The spontaneous evolution of PFI financial 
structures already leads to a gradual lowering of the financial coverage ratios and to increasing 
leverages. A competition could lead to a stronger financial vulnerability, especially if it induces a 
more bond-based financing, which is flexible with strong difficulties (Marty and Voisin, 2006). 
Conversely, running for the private partner a separate competition for funding can compromise 
the maximisation of the contract value for money by deterring most innovative financial set-up. 
We also have to consider that in conventional PFI schemes, the upstream assessment of the bids 
by financial actors constitutes a kind of guarantee of their realism and viability. We may consider, 
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in such a way, that even in the case of a bundled contract, SPE sponsors are directly incentivised 
to obtain the most competitive finance.  
 
We have also to compare the potential benefits of such competition in comparison with the 
transactions costs it induces. Private funding represents a net cost over conventionally funded 
procurement financed through gild, in other words by the issuance of sovereign debt. If 
promoting competition may reduce such differential, the fact remains that the additional cost of 
private finance can be limited to 80 bp by financial tools and it usually represents less than 5 % of 
the overall cost of the project (HM Treasury, 2006).  
 
Transaction costs are, in fact, one of the main issues of the PFI experience. In the case of 
conventional PFI, transaction costs remain too high, despite the standardisation of the contracts, 
and can be, in some cases, prohibitive for bidders (Holder, 2006). In addition, the negotiations 
take a very long time to reach the financial close step. A stricking example of the duration of the 
contractual negotiations induced by PFI contracts and of the associated risks can be found with 
the Skynet V project5 (NAO, 2006b).  
 
Long term and complex contracts, as PFI, imply high transaction costs. Two kinds of ex ante 
transaction costs are distinguished in the literature. The first type tallies with search costs, in 
other words, the costs of thinking through the contract’s implications (Klein, 2002). The second 
are the “ink costs”, the costs of actually writing the contract (Dye, 1985).  PFI also induce ex post 
transaction costs relative to the partner monitoring. Such costs could undermine the gross 
                                                 
5 Skynet contract is relating to satellite communications services for military uses. The Ministry of Defence (MoD) 
decided to renew its conventionally procured system Skynet IV in 1993. The MoD chosed the PFI solution in 1999 
and began the competitive process in July 2000 with an invitation to negotiate sent to two potential bidders. 
Paradigm (an EADS subsidiary) was selected as preferred bidder in February 2002 and the deal was stricken in 
October 2003. But during the time taken by the process, market conditions evolved. From 2002, it appeared that 
insurance markets were no more able to cover contract’s risks. A revision of the deal at such late stage would have 
created a risk of termination of the contract. The MoD rather preferred to sign the contract in October 2003, 
knowing that a deal restructuring will be unavoidable in the very short term. This renegotiation began from 2004 and 
the deal was deeply restructured in December 2005. The MoD accepted to commit himself in a contract, which must 
be renegotiated immediately (with the associated risks of contractual opportunism) because he had considered the 
major risks of the fresh start alternative. First, delaying contract signature would have probably delayed the provision 
of the service, creating a capacity gap for the military telecommunications. Second, the MoD took into account a 
legal risk. The other bidder could bring the procurement process before the courts if such contractual adjustments 
may change the nature of the deal during the procurement process. The Skynet example testimonies from the long 
duration of PFI process and puts into relief the risk induced by such duration. We have to consider that a separated 
competition for the funding would induce additional time and exacerbate legal risks upon the procurement5. A 
specific competition for the funding could induce additional time between the definition of the contractual terms and 
the financial close of the deal (above all if it is not integrated to the whole competitive process since its beginning). 
Such delays could exacerbate the potential (and the need) for change in the service and increase the possibility of 
disagreements between the parties (HM Treasury, 2006).Moreover, a specific competition on the debt could push 
upwards PFI transaction costs. 
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efficiency gains of partnerships and limit ex ante competition by rising entry costs for potential 
bidders. In a PPP, the tendering, contracting and monitoring processes are more resource 
consuming than traditional procurement. The transaction costs are all the more significant than 
unavoidable renegotiations will be costly for the two partners. Therefore, HM Treasury considers 
that £20 millions is the minimum capital value for running a PFI without the risk to see 
contracting costs cancel the potential benefits of the partnership. Allen (2001) also considers that 
bidding costs represent for all the potential contractors in a tendering process about 3 % of the 
project total expected cost6. Such percentage is three time higher than its value in conventional 
procurement7. Consequently such transaction costs must be integrated by the public contractor8 
in its budget and are susceptible, in the same time, to deter bidders.  The National Audit Office 
wrote in a report on value for money “at the outset of a deal departments need to set realistic 
budgets of their own administrative costs, to monitor these costs and seek to keep them under 
control. They must be also mindful of the costs to bidders. Imposing excessive costs on bidders 
is likely to result in higher charges in the long run and might deter firms from bidding” (NAO, 
2003). 
 
Because of such deterring costs, the public authority is often bound to compensate for bidder 
costs as it in the case for the London Underground PPP contracts. Taken into account public 
transaction cost and such reimbursement can undermine the potential gains of PPP. For the 
London Underground, the public authority initially budgeted £150 millions (the outturn was 
£180 millions) and must finally pay to the bidders £275 millions (NAO, 2004). But transaction 
costs do not just occur at the procurement stage. The private provision of services entail higher 
monitoring costs than conventional procurement schemes. Costs are all the more higher than the 
contract poorly specify the expected service. For example, in the United States, the costs induced 
by the monitoring of the performance of private contractors are assessed between 3 and 25 % of 
the contract values (Torres and Pina, 2001). Comparable amounts could be observed in UK for 
the franchised railways (Jupe, 2007). The privatisation of the publicly-owned and vertically 
integrated firm, British Rail, induced the creation of 25 (19 since 2006) franchises operated by 
train operating companies (TOCs). The UK Department for Transport (2004) considers that the 
value for money of the deals is underpinned by franchisees poor performance, especially in terms 
                                                 
6 In the PRIME PFI deal (NAO, 1999a), the cost of the whole procedure amounted to £10.9 millions for the public 
partner (£1.7 million expected) and to £27 millions for the bidders.  
7 Advisory costs are very significant in PFI deals (Välilä, 2005). Their averaged amount is about 3.7% of the project 
capital values. For smaller project, they can reach 10%. 
8 For the Newcastle Estate PFI contract (NAO, 1999b) the cost of procurement initially assessed at 400 000£ by the 
public contractor finally reached £4.4 millions. It represented 2% of the discounted contract value. 
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of quality of service, and by the government “failure to control costs”. Indeed UK railways 
regulation induces significant costs of transaction both for running the tendering process and for 
administrating and monitoring contracts. For the Strategic Railways Authority, the annual average 
cost of the tendering process was £3 millions in 2004. In the same time, franchise management 
represented a third of its operating budget (£30 millions). 
 
It finally appears that a debt funding competition is useful in the case of an absence of sufficient 
competitive pressure among PFI bidders. Such competition has to be organise when public 
authority faces a monopolistic market or when collusion among bidders is feared. The case of the 
Treasury building also shows that a debt funding competition is welcome when the time taken 
between the selection of the preferred bidder and the financial close of the deal is too long.  
 
However, organising such competition supposes that the negotiated contract terms are 
commercially viable. It would be also easier for conventional projects, as school or hospital 
buildings. For such contracts funders are well experimented and can assess quickly the risk profile 
of a project as well as the credit worthiness of its sponsors. In addition, experience on 
conventional contracts showed that the terms of senior debt are reasonably predictable for both 
partner (HM Treasury, 2006). It could be quite different for more complex projects for which 
funders have little (or no) previous experience. In these cases funders need to undertake 
considerable and by the way costly due diligence. Thus, competition cannot be just focused on 
risk assessment and pricing. Investors would require, for debt funding competitions relative to 
highly complex project, a long period of evaluation or the right to discuss the initial risk 
allocation between partners. Indeed, funders, at the opposite of conventional PFI contracts, have 
not been involved at the first stages of negotiations where the economic model of the contract 
was set and the risks shared. The funders could consider the previous decisions of the 
contractors as sub-optimal or, at worse, as risk inducer.  
 
Thus, funders could refuse some contractual disposals. For example, protections set in case of 
SPE failures can be considered insufficient. The risk allocation within the private sector can also 
be seen as a factor of vulnerability for the lenders. The decision of running a separate debt 
funding competition for the FSTA project, if it could be explain by the funds which are needed, 
is quite paradoxically. Because of the complexity of the deal the expectation of a funding 
competition had already induced delays. Indeed, the Financial Times revealed the June 7th 2007, 
“negotiations had dragged on because of the need to ensure the terms of the deal would not be 
 17
rewritten during the financing round. Securing finance on some other PFI deals has taken more 
than a year”. 
 
 
As a conclusion of this first part, we may consider, after Jean Tirole (2007), that relying on the 
signals given by external financial actors help to increase, for the public contractor, information 
about the economic and financial equilibriums of the contract. However, organising a debt 
funding competition would increase PFI transaction costs. The expectation of British authorities 
is that the additional transaction costs could be limited if the financial assessment is made when 
the risk allocation is already set and the economic model of the project precisely defined (NAO, 
2001). In this case, financial institutions could be more efficient as they assess a commercially 
viable project. For the NAO, it would be more costly to price risk upstream, before the 
negotiation stage, than at such final step. In this way, the NAO thinks that the transaction costs 
would be not so higher in the case of a debt funding competition.  In addition, these additional 
costs must be throwing into the economic equation of the contract. Ex ante, they allow limiting 
wasteful cognitive expenses for the public contractor. Ex post, they allow outsourcing a part of 
the monitoring costs. So a separated competition on the financing partially solves the 
conventional limit of the other types of competition for the market. As Tirole (2007) wrote: 
“Competition in general does not reduce the buyer’s transaction costs. Intuitively, the buyer is 
worried about the occurrence of ex post hold-up, and this concern is the same regardless of the 
extent of ex ante competition”. The alignment of the interests of lenders and public contractor 
helps to impede such temptation. 
 
 
 
 
2 – THE FINANCIERS’ COMMITMENT AS A MEANS TO MAINTAIN COMPETITION WITHIN THE 
CONTRACT AND TO REDUCE MORAL HAZARD 
 
As discussed above, the new PPP framework derived from the British Private Finance Initiative 
(PFI) is based on project finance. This characteristic has a strong influence on the governance of 
the projects, as the lenders have to select carefully the deals they fund and to ensure during the 
whole life cycle of the project the repayment of the operator's debt. We will in the first place 
study the alignment of interest between the financiers and the public partner, resulting in a series 
 18
of contracts re-allocating the risk transferred through the PPP deal between the private 
stakeholders. In the second place, we will analyse the mechanisms allowing for competition 
within the contract, mainly consisting in performance monitoring of the service suppliers and 
value testing of the soft facility management services. 
 
A – The financiers and the public partner share common interests in the SPE governance 
 
In most PFI contracts, the debt of the Special purpose vehicle (SPE) represents up to 90% of the 
project’s capital expenditure. The funding is provided by bank finance, involving a pool of 
financiers. When the cost and risk profile of the project allow for it, financing can rely on bonds 
and securitisation. In both sources of funding, the financiers bear a significant part of the project 
risks, as the repayment of debt can be compromised by the failure of the contract. This feature 
incentivises the banks and bond holders to ensure the success of the project, thus being on the 
public partner's side rather than on the sponsors' side.  
 
1 – The financiers' interest is to ensure the contract meets the public sector's objectives 
 
Given their financial commitment in the project, the role of the financiers doesn’t end at the 
signature of the contract. They are committed to ensure that the project meets its objectives and 
provides the expected return on investment. As Vinter (2004) points out, project finance 
arrangements imply a prominent role of the lenders. Their interest in the project being to make 
profit through credit margins and arrangement fees, their main objective is to secure the debt 
repayment. To this end, they require control over key project decisions and ring-fence the 
project’s profile through restrictive financial covenants and back to back contracts between the 
private stakeholders of the project. These claims lead to intense negotiations with the sponsors of 
the project, as the latter may lose their grip on the project. This fear is fuelled by the fact that the 
lenders often require a "step-in" clause, allowing them to take control of the project in times of 
hardship 
 
The loan agreement is a key device in the governance of the SPE and beyond, of the PPP 
contract. In order to monitor the project’s ability to repay its debt, the banks have a close scrutiny 
on key debt ratios; the most widely used being the Annual Debt Service Coverage Ratio (ADSCR). 
This ratio ensures that the revenues of the SPE, net from operating costs, cover the repayment of 
the debt with a security margin. In most PFI contracts involving services sold to the public 
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sector, this ratio represents on average 1.2 times the annual debt service. Projects involving 
higher risks, such as demand risks, will require higher ratios (du Moutier, 2006). There has been a 
rising concern amongst the rating agency about the decrease of ADSCR in recent British PFI 
projects. Funding competition has driven the lenders to accept ratios below 1.2, at a time when 
the World Bank recommends an ADCSR over 1.3 (Marty & Voisin, 2006).  
 
One of the consequences of the monitoring of ADSCR ratio bears on the efficiency of 
performance payment mechanisms. NAO (2003) shows that the deductions applied to PFI 
prisons, though representing a small amount of the normal unitary charge (1.5 to 3%), resulted in 
most cases in performance improvements (see figure above). 
 
 Opening year 1st year 2nd year 3rd year 4th year 
Parc 1997 750 000 £ 109 000 £ 3 500 £ 0 £
Altcourse 1997 195 000 £ 108 000 £ 34 000 £ 0 £
Lowdham Grange 1998 83 000 £ 11 865 £ 0 £ 0 £
Ashfield 1999 50 000 £ 66 000 £ 200 000 £ 0 £
Forest Bank 2000 0 £ 0 £ 0 £ 0 £
Rye Hill 2001 0 £ 65 589 £ 0 £ 0 £
Dovergate 2001 423 000 £ 0 £ 0 £ 0 £
Source: National Audit Office (2003) “The Operational Performance of Prisons” 
 
More recently, on a wider number of PFI contracts, Partnerships UK (2006) found out that 
performance deductions resulted in 70% of instances in performance improvements. As in the 
prisons case, the deductions applied were most of the time limited and sometimes waived off by 
the public partner. Another finding was that there was equally no evidence of deductions 
resulting in performance reduction. 
 
To our opinion, these findings illustrate the leverage effect of Annual Debt Service Coverage 
Ratio on deductions. The example below illustrates the strong incentive created by the 
combination of public partner’s and financier’s requirements. On must keep in mind that in some 
contracts, such as MoD Main Building Redevelopment (NAO, 2002); the total amount of 
deduction can reach up to 20% of the unitary charge. 
 
Combined effect of performance deduction and ADSCR in a PFI project 
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We consider a PFI contract where the SPE’s annual costs in real terms are:  
 
- Debt repayment, 5 €M 
- Operating expenditure, 4 €M 
- Margin on operating expenditure, 5% 
 
The loan agreements sets the ADSCR at 1.2 times the debt repayment 
 
The expected unitary charge amounts then to: 
 
(5 x 1.2) + (4 x 1.05) = 6 + 4.2 = 10.2 €M 
 
A deduction of only 2% reduces the unitary charge to (10.2 – 0.2) = 10 €M 
 
In order to conform to the ADSCR requirement, the operator must renounce its margin, 
thus making no profit 
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2 - Back to back contracts are designed to limit free riding behaviour 
 
One of the issues faced by PPP using project finance is the free-riding behaviour of the 
stakeholders. For instance, equity investors may attempt to bail out of the project when their 
return on investment reaches the expected level. The constructors may as well exit the SPE once 
the building phase has ended. The financiers’ interest is to prevent these strategies, in line with 
the public partner’s interest. One of its main purposes is to insulate the SPE from most of the 
project's risks, using the "pass through" technique: the SPE is purely a financing vehicle, the risks 
being borne by the other stakeholders. Some risks should though be retained, in order to 
incentivise the SPE to be efficient.  
 
Project finance has since long developed mechanisms to limit free riding between the project’s 
stakeholders. Under the principal contract with the public partner, there exist numerous 
agreements bonding the private sector partners together. The purpose of these “contracts within 
the contract” is to allocate to the party the most able to manage them the risks transferred 
through the PPP contract from the public to the private sector. These back to back contracts are 
an essential part of a PPP global design, as they replicate the obligations of the main contract. 
The numerous underlying contracts in a PFI deal with shareholders, constructors and operation 
and maintenance firms. 
 
Shareholders agreements guarantee the ownership of the SPE. As in the case of a joint venture, it 
provides pre-emption rights for the existing shareholders when one of them wants to sell its 
interests, non-competition clauses and aims at preventing conflicts of interests. 
 
Construction contracts can be signed with one or several construction firms, generally on a fixed 
price basis. When the construction period is long and involve several sites, the contract may 
include several packages. For instance, the Ministry of Defence Allenby-Connaught 
accommodation project has a 10-year construction period involving four garrisons, for a capital 
value of 1.2 £Bn. Therefore, the construction is separated into tasks with prices categories 
ranging from “firm”, “fixed”, and “competed” (Manley & Alii 2006).  
 
Replication of the PPP contract obligations within the underlying private sector contract is a key 
feature of the incentive power of these arrangements. We can see evidence of the adverse effect 
of improper design of these contracts in NAO (2006). In that case, a PFI was signed in 1998 to 
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build and operate the National Physical Laboratory, a complex set of highly specialised 
laboratories. The building contract between the SPE and the constructor was not aligned with the 
performance clauses of the PFI contract. The building phase resulted in delays and extra costs 
due to the inability of the contractor to meet the technical requirements. However, the latter had 
received 90 % of the expected payments, though less than 60 % of the asset had been built. The 
contract was terminated by the end of 2004, after several salvage attempts.  
 
Conversely, "turnkey" construction contracts matching the PFI contract obligations meet the 
expected targets in costs and delays: MoD Private Finance Unit (2005) shows that in the sensitive 
domain of Defence, all 29 projects evaluated remained within their budget limits and with only 
two exceptions – due to the public partner - met their expected timetables.  
 
Operation and maintenance contracts are also required when the project company cannot carry 
them out. As the main objective of the SPE is keeping down costs, the operation and 
maintenance contractors are not necessarily selected amongst parent companies of the 
shareholders. As the maintenance and operation risks are passed through the SPE to the relevant 
subcontractors, the shareholders are indifferent to the companies selected. We will see later that 
this principle provides a strong basis for competition within the contract. 
 
 
The specific structure of PFI-type deals provides new sources of incentives in PPP. As the main 
feature of these contracts is the construction of a asset financed by a high gearing of debt, the 
repayment constraint incentivises the private partner to meet the performance level required. The 
project finance underlying the deal demands also a tight network of mutual obligations between 
the various private stakeholders of the project. These back to back contracts are designed to bind 
all the parties to the project's fate  
 
 
B – The mechanisms allowing for competition within the contract 
 
In United Kingdom, such mechanisms were already part of early PFI contract design, but they 
have been formalised and systematised through the standardisation of PFI contracts initiated by 
the HM Treasury in 1999. There exist two main categories of competition drivers: the 
performance monitoring mechanism, which can result in re-tendering against poorly-performing 
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service providers and the value testing processes, which incentivise the contractor to keep costs 
in line with the market. 
 
1 - Performance monitoring and replacement of poor-performing service providers 
 
In most contracts, performance is measured by both public and private partners. For instance, in 
the MoD Main Building Redevelopment contract, the public partner undertakes service audits 
with the company of the private partner's staff, but the Ministry of Defence does not inform him 
until the actual day of which the part of the building that will be subject to the audit (NAO 
2002b). 
 
Performance monitoring raises the issue of its burden-sharing between the public and the private 
partners. Along with the costs of the tendering process, they represent a significant part of total 
transaction costs for both parties (Allen, 2001). 
 
As a general principle, monitoring costs should be proportional to the consequences of poor 
performance. Only the critical areas of service should be subjected to a rigorous monitoring 
system (HM Treasury, 2004). A balance must be found between the comprehensiveness of 
performance monitoring and the prioritisation of the indicators. In its report on the operational 
performance of prisons (NAO, 2003), the National Audit Office found out that the United 
Kingdom's Prisons Service was using a set of 90 key performance indicators (KPI) in its 
evaluations. After prioritising these indicators and reducing then number to sixteen, it appeared 
that the ranking of prisons by performance was not altered when relying on fewer indicators. 
 
Performance mechanisms offer flexible responses according to the severity of the situation. Poor 
performance, as was previously demonstrated, results in payment deductions. When the 
underlying contracts of the PFI projects are adequately designed, the deduction is borne by the 
provider of the defaulting service. If the whole package of services shows poor performance or if 
a critical service is permanently under the standards, this may lead to the termination of the PFI 
contract. 
 
Keeping in mind the eventuality of a contract termination, we will however focus on the most 
likely event, the persisting poor performance of a sub-contractor. If the payment deduction he 
incurs fails to remedy its poor performance, there are provisions in the PFI contract for its 
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replacement. The SPE has to set up a competition and to select another sub-contractor. In this 
case, its interests are aligned with those of the public partner, as a repeated poor performance 
may lead to the termination of the PFI contract. 
 
The threshold triggering the replacement of the non-performing service provider is subject to 
fine-balancing issues of duration and deduction. The chart below shows the terms and conditions 
under which a subcontractor is replaced or the contract terminated. Each category of services has 
a number of performance points available and the percentage is calculated against this reference. 
The 1.84 £M of performance deduction corresponds to up to 20% of the unitary charge of the 
contract, amounting to 90 £M a year (NAO, 2002b). 
 
 
Source, NAO (2002) "MoD Main Building Redevelopment"  
 
Performance measurement must be "reasonable and objectively measurable" (HM Treasury, 
2004). As they seek repayment of the project's debt, the financiers want to ensure that only 
significant drops of performance will be subject to deductions. The public partner may require a 
100% availability in critical areas of service (e.g. operating theatres in hospitals) and allow for a 
threshold (for instance, of 90%) allowing for slight underperformance in other areas. In some 
contracts, this relaxed deduction regime is linked to a formal warning notice to the contractor, 
constituting a non-monetary incentive (NAO, 2002a). 
 
If we refer to the existing contracts, keeping in mind that the available data reflects the early years 
of in-life PFI, there is few evidence of subcontractors' replacement. According to Partnerships 
UK (2006), in more than half of the reviewed projects, there was no change in subcontractors 
resulting from performance deduction. This result must be analysed in relation to the low level of 
deduction we referred above. 
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2 - Benchmarking and market testing 
 
Testing the value of services provided within a PPP is a means to reintroduce competitive tension 
within the contract. It concerns mainly services which scope is precisely identified, such as 
catering or cleaning: specific or complex services will not thus fall within this category. Value 
testing excludes also services related to the life-cycle cost of the contract, as re-tendering them 
would imply the renegotiation of a new PFI deal. 
 
According to NAO (2007), 250 PFI projects are known to have provision for testing the value of 
certain services (catering, cleaning…), with intervals of 5 to 7 years. These services represent a 
significant part of the total cost of a PFI contract: for instance, in the PFI contract for Darent 
Valley Hospital, 28% of the unitary charge is submitted to value tests. Value testing is performed 
through comparisons between the current service provider and market prices (benchmarking) or 
through invitation of other suppliers to compete with the current provider (market testing).  
 
Benchmarking is potentially the less costly option, as no re-tendering is involved. Several sources 
might be used. A first information can be gathered from other existing similar PFI deals (e.g., 
hospitals or prisons, the deals being numerous and similar in their scope). This practice implies 
drawing up a database at government level, in order to streamline the comparison process. The 
second source of information relies on market prices, but requires the presence of perfectly 
comparable services in the market. 
  
Market testing results in a re-tendering of the service against the incumbent supplier. It is likely to 
be more challenging for the provider, as the firms bidding against him will tend to be aggressive 
on prices in order to be selected. However, the transaction costs of market testing are higher than 
benchmarking, for both the public and the private sectors. Past experience on market testing 
within British government has resulted in inconclusive results. 
 
This practice was first implemented by the Thatcher's government in the 80's. Any public service 
could be provided either by the public sector, either by a private company, the only criterion 
being cost-benefit analysis. Most of the tendering processes were won by the public sector, which 
was in a dominant position due to its asymmetry of information on the service expected and to 
the preliminary rationalisation of its organisation. The private sector accused the government of 
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viewing them as a spur in order to foster reforms and not as a true alternative for public service 
provision (Marty & Alii, 2004).  
 
Benchmarking may results as well in a cost reduction as in a readjustment of the PFI price. It is 
therefore similar in its principle to a renegotiation. Most PFI contracts have provisions to share 
the gains and losses of this process. As an example, in the MoD Main Building Redevelopment 
deal, the ministry of Defence requires the contractor to benchmark and market test the costs of 
the various facility management services, 10 years after the signature of the contract, and 
thereafter at 5-year intervals. Cost savings or increases are shared in the ratio of 80 % for the 
Ministry and 20 % for the contractor, within a limit of a maximum of £M 10 of extra costs for 
the latter (NAO 2002b). 
 
NAO report on value testing (NAO, 2007) examined 34 contracts, as well as 11 early PFI 
projects that had carried out value testing in summer 2006. Before contract standardisation in 
1999, PFI included provisions for value testing, but on the 34 contracts of the sample, value 
testing terms were often expected to have limited effectiveness. Since October 2006, the Treasury 
has issued new guidance (HM Treasury, 2006), in order to improve value for money through 
competition, transparency and reassessment of service provision. In this perspective, market 
testing is the mechanism most suitable to achieve this goal. 
 
Only three market tests had been completed at the time of the study. External suppliers were not 
successful, as one tender was won by an in-house bid and the two others by the incumbent 
suppliers. Treasury insists in maintaining interest of suppliers in bidding against the incumbent 
suppliers. 
 
It appears that value testing can be a lengthy process, the few existing processes ranging from 9 
to 25 months. These delays are similar to the time taken to re-let services contract in 
conventional procurement. Some projects have difficulties in finding suitable benchmarks for 
comparisons.  
 
In terms of costs and saving resulting from value testing, the results vary according to the sector 
of the deal. For instance, in the cases of two telecommunication projects, prices reductions of 
19 % and 37 % after using benchmarking. Telecommunication is a very competitive sector, with 
prices decreasing at a fast rate, especially when the service requirement evolves at a slower pace in 
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the public sector than in the private sector. Conversely, value testing in building projects has 
resulted in adjustments between –2 to 6%, with an exceptional 14% in one school project. 
Building industry is subject to the increasing cost of raw materials and energy and shows less 
opportunity for cost reduction. 
 
We can analyse value testing as a means for the public sector to benefit from prices decrease 
opportunities, but reintroducing the risk of increases in the unitary charge of the contract. 
Literature shows that renegotiation can result from the strategic behaviour of the contractor, 
threatening the public partner of a contract termination (Guasch & Alii, 2003). In terms of 
contract governance, forecasted renegotiations should prevent the issue of renegotiating only 
when the contract is at risk. Value testing should then be seen as a means to restore the initial 
economic terms of the PPP contract.  
 
On a pure conceptual basis benchmarking and market testing may be seen as amendments to the 
general PFI philosophy, as the latter is based on a trade-off between cost and certainty (Marty & 
Alii, 2004). Entering a PPP deal is in some way similar to buying a financial option at an agreed 
rate. The decision of the public sector is based on the comparison of the relative volatility of 
prices in conventional and in PPP procurement routes. The public sector might wish, for political 
reasons, benefit from potential upsides, and then take back the risk of downsides. 
  
To date, the experience gained on value testing raises the issue of the scope of PFI contracts. 
One may wonder if the services subject to testing should continue to be included in PPP 
arrangement and could not rather be contracted apart from the main deals, in a conventional 
procurement route. On the other hand, as the life cycle cost of the underlying asset constitutes 
the core of a PFI, soft facility management services are most of the time viewed as an additional 
sources of savings on the total cost of a deal (Allen, 2001). In terms of transaction costs, the 
interest of the public partner is to transfer all or at least part of the benchmarking and re-
tendering costs to the private sector. As he is not submitted to public contracts regulations, the 
latter should be able to manage these procedures at a better cost than the public sector. 
 
As a conclusion to this section, we have shown that project finance provides the PPP deals with a 
financial ad contractual framework in which the financiers act most of the time as representatives 
of the public partner's interests. This framework allows for reintroducing competition in the 
contract, through performance monitoring and value testing. Theoretically, this set of 
 28
mechanisms provides competitive pressure through strong incentives to maintain performance 
and keep prices down. However, evidences of the efficiency of this framework can only be found 
on the first operational years of the contracts analysed, as most PFI are in the early years of their 
life-cycle.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Private finance has brought to public-private partnerships a third-party overlook on the 
contracts. Financier provides a remedy to the asymmetries of information that the public sector 
experiences with its contractors. Bringing into the appraisal of PPP deals banks and rating 
agencies results in outsourcing the due diligence of the project to the parties best suited to 
perform it. This reduction in asymmetries of information can occur both in the competition for 
the market stage or in the competition within the market stage. 
 
At the negotiation stage, funding competition helps to increase the public sector's information on 
the deal. Of course, the cost of collecting this information should not overweight the savings it 
induces. In this case, the size of the deal, as well as the number of bidders, plays a prominent role 
in the trade-off. They may also be adverse effects because the financiers face projects which 
general terms have already been agreed once for all and offer no room for adjustments. A 
complex deal will thus provide less value for money if submitted to a funding competition, as the 
bidders will perform individually due diligence processes and increase the overall transaction 
costs.  
 
If competition for the contract in PPP can be improved through funding competition, there 
remains issues about maintaining competitive pressure through the lifecycle of the project. PPP 
contracts relying on private finance imply an underlying framework of back-to-back contracts, 
bounding together the project's stakeholders and designed to prevent free riding behaviour. As 
they allow for re-allocating the risk transferred by the public partner to the party best able to 
manage it, these contracts creates an incentive framework under the supervision of the financiers. 
 
PFI-type deals involve asset life cycle costs and operating expenditure. Soft management facilities 
services can be individually monitored, as they are not as closely related to lifecycle as capital and 
maintenance expenditure. Simple services like catering or cleaning can be submitted to value 
testing. The less costly process is benchmarking, when market prices of a given service can be 
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directly compared with the cost of the service under the PFI contract. Market testing results in a 
re-tendering of the service provided through PFI contract. This procedure induce higher costs 
for both the bidders and the public sector and in most cases take as much time as a conventional 
procurement  process. Competition within the contract may result in an increase in prices, for 
example when the benchmark bears on an activity submitted to above general inflation cost 
escalations. In most contracts, the savings and increases in costs are capped through an incentive 
scheme, letting part of the gains or losses to the private sector. 
 
 
 
 
 30
Bibliography 
 
Aghion P. and Tirole J., (1997), “Formal and Real Authority in Organizations”, Journal of Political 
Economy, 105, pp.1-29. 
 
Allen G., (2001), “The Private Finance Initiative”, House of Commons, Economic Policy and 
Statistics Section, Research Paper 01/ 117, December. 
 
Allen G., (2003), "The Private Finance Initiative", House of Commons Research Paper 03/79, 
Economic Policy and Statistics Section, octobre. 
 
Berle A. and Means G., (1932), The Modern Corporation and Private Property, Transaction Publishers, 
revised edition 1964. 
 
Bureau D. et Mougeot M., (2007), Performances, incitations et gestion publique, Rapport du Conseil 
d’Analyse Economique, Paris, 135p 
 
Chaldwick S.E., (1859), “Results of Different Principles of Legislation and Administration in 
Europe: of Competition for the Field as Compared with Competition within the Field of 
Service”, Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, pp.381-420. 
 
Chong E., Huet F., Saussier S. and Steiner F., (2007), “Public-Private Partnerships and Prices: 
Evidence from Water Distribution in France”, Review of Industrial Organisation, forthcoming. 
 
Chong E. et Huet F., (2007), « Partenariats public-privé et investissements de fin de contrat : le 
cas de l’industrie de l’eau en France », Document de travail GREDEG, novembre, 41p. 
 
Demsetz H., (1968), “Why Regulate Utilities”, Journal of Law and Economics, volume 11, pp.55-66. 
 
Department for Transport, (2004), The Future of Rail, London, July. 
 
Dewatripont M. and Legros P., (2005), “Public-Private Partnerships: Contract Design and Risk 
Transfer”, European Investment Bank Papers, volume 10, n° 1, pp. 121-145. 
 
 31
Diamond D. W., (1984), “Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring”, Review of 
Economics Studies, volume 51, pp. 393-411. 
 
Dye R., (1985), “Costly Contract Contingencies”, International Economic Review, pp. 233-250. 
 
Farquharson E., (2007), “UK PFI Recent Measures Further to Improve Delivery and 
Management of PFI Projects”, International Monetary Fund, Seminar on Strengthening Public 
Investment and Managing Fiscal Risks from Public-Private Partnerships, Budapest, March. 
 
Guasch J.L., Laffont J.-J. and Straub S., (2003), "Renegotiation of Concession Contracts in Latin 
America", Working Paper, University of Edinburgh. 
 
Hart O. (2003), « Incomplete contracts and public ownership: remarks, and an application to 
public-private partnerships », The Economic Journal, vol. 113, mars, p. C69-C76. 
 
Hart O. and Moore J. (1988), “Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation”, Econometrica, volume 
56, pp.509-540. 
 
Hart O., Schleifer A. and Vishny R.W., (1997), “The Proper Scope of Government: Theory and 
Application to Prisons”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, volume 112, n°4, pp.1126-1161. 
 
Her Majesty Treasury, (2003), “PFI – Meeting the Investment Challenge”, London. 
 
Her Majesty Treasury, (2004), “Standardisation of PFI Contracts – Version 3”, April. 
 
Her Majesty Treasury, (2006), “Preferred Bidder Debt Funding Competitions: Draft Outline 
Guidance for Feedback”, August, 12p. 
 
Hirschleifer J., (1971), “The Private and the Social Value of Information and the Reward of 
Inventive Activities”, American Economic Review, volume 61, pp.561-574. 
 
Holder R., (2006), “A Decade of PFI Imparts Discipline and Process to UK Public Sector 
Infrastructure Procurement”, Standard & Poor’s PPP Credit Survey, May, pp.4-6. 
 
 32
Huet F., (2006), « Partenariats Public-Privé et concurrence pour le marché: quelles avancées 
depuis Demsetz (1968) ? », 53e Congrès de l’AFSE, Paris, septembre, 57p. 
 
Kirat T. et Marty F., (2005), « L’économie de la répartition des risques dans les contrats 
administratifs: Les problématiques économiques », in Kirat T. (s.d.), Economie et droit du contrat 
administratif : L’allocation des risques dans les marchés publics et les délégations de service public, La 
Documentation Française, Paris, août, pp. 25-56. 
 
Klein E., (2002), “The Role of Incomplete Contract in Self Enforcing Relationships”, in 
Brousseau E. and Glachant J.M., (ed.), The Economics of Contract, Cambridge University Press, pp. 
549-571. 
 
Jensen M. and Meckling W., (1976), “The Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency 
Costs and Ownership Structures”, Journal of Financial Economics, volume 3, pp. 305-360. 
 
Jupe R., (2007), “Rail Franchising Matters – the Award of Open Access Rights on the ECML”, 
Public Money and Management, February, pp. 83-86. 
 
Laffont J.-J. and Tirole J., (1986), "Using Cost Observations to Regulate Firms", Journal of Political 
Economy, n° 94, pp. 614-641 
 
Laffont J.-J. and Tirole J., (1993), A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation, MIT Press, 
Boston Ma. 
 
Lyonnet du Moutier M., (2006), Financement sur projet et partenariats public-privé, éditions EMS, Paris. 
 
Manley J. and Alii, (2006), "Presale: Aspire Defence Finance PLC" Standard and Poor's 
Infrastructure Finance, March 
 
Marty F., Trosa S. et Voisin A., (2004), "La construction des méthodes de comparaison de coûts 
public-privé: les enseignements des expériences étrangères", revue Politiques et management public, 
volume 22, n°3, septembre, pp. 43-61. 
 
 33
Marty F., Trosa S. and Voisin A., (2005), "The Financial Determinants of Government 
commitment in Public-Private Partnerships, International Journal of Public Policy Vol. 1, n° 1-2, pp. 
141-157. 
 
Marty F., Trosa S. et Voisin A., (2006), Les partenariats public-privé, La Découverte, collection 
Repères n° 441, Paris, mai, 122p. 
 
Marty F. et Voisin A., (2006), « L’évolution des montages financiers des PFI britanniques : la 
montée des risques », Revue française de finances publiques, n°94, mai, pp.107-120. 
 
Marty F., (2007), Partenariats public-privé, règles de discipline budgétaire, comptabilité 
patrimoniale et stratégies de hors bilan », Document de travail OFCE, n° 2007-29, octobre, 48p. 
 
Mireur F., (2007), Approche financière du project finance infrastructure. La rénovation du métro londonien, 
Mémoire de Master 2 financement de projet / financements structurés, Paris 10 Nanterre, juin. 
 
Mougeot M. and Naegelen F., (2007), “Was Chaldwick Right?”, Review of Industrial Organisation, 
volume 30, number 2, march, pp.121-137. 
 
National Audit Office, (1999a), “The PRIME Project: The Transfer to the Department of Social 
Security Estate to Private Sector”, HC 548, session 1999-2000, December. 
 
National Audit Office, (1999b), “The Newcastle Estate Development Project”, HC 16, 
November, 85p. 
 
National Audit Office, (2001), "Innovation in PFI Financing: the Treasury Building Project", HC 
328, Session 2001-2002, November, 35p. 
 
National Audit Office, (2002), "Ministry of Defence: The Joint Services Command and Staff 
College", HC 537 Session 2001-2002, February  
 
National Audit Office, (2002), “MoD: Main Building Redevelopment”, HC 748 Session 2001-
2002, April.  
 
 34
National Audit Office, (2003), “Delivering Better Value for Money from the Private Finance 
Initiative”, June. 
 
National Audit Office, (2004), “London Underground PPP: Where they Good Deals?”, June. 
 
National Audit Office, (2006a), "The Termination of the PFI Contract for the National Physical 
Laboratory", HC 1044 Session 2005-2006, May. 
 
National Audit Office, (2006b), Ministry of Defence – Major Projects Report 2006, HC 23, session 
2006-2007, November. 
 
National Audit Office, (2007), "Benchmarking & market testing the ongoing services of PFI 
projects", HC 453 Session 2006-2007, June. 
 
Partnerships UK, (2006), Report on Operational PPP/PFI Projects, March. 
 
Prager R.A., (1990), “Firm Behaviour in Franchise Monopoly Markets”, Rand Journal of Economics, 
volume 21, pp. 211-215. 
 
Saussier S. and Yvrande-Billon A., (2007), Economie des coûts de transaction, La Découverte – 
collection Repères n°408, Paris, 122p. 
 
Singh R., Archer A. and Manley J., (2006), “European PFI/PPP Secondary Market Starts to 
Witness Steady Growth”, Standard and Poor’s PPP Credit Survey 2006, May, pp. 37-38. 
 
Tirole J., (2007), “Bounded Rationality and Incomplete Contracts”, Working Paper IDEI, 
Université de Toulouse 1, May, 37p. 
 
Torres L. and Pina V., (2004), “Public-Private Partnerships and Private Finance in the US and 
Spanish Local Governments”, The European Accounting Review, 10-3, pp. 601-619. 
 
Välilä, T., (2005), “How Expensive are Cost Savings. On the Economic of Public-Private 
Partnerships”, European Investment Bank Papers, volume 10, n° 1, pp. 94-119. 
 
 35
Vinter, G.D., (1997), Project Finance, a Legal Guide, Sweet and Maxwell, London, 352 p 
 
Williamson O.E., (1976), “Franchise Bidding for Natural Monopolies – In General and with 
Respect to CATV”, Bell Journal of Economics, volume 7, number 1, Spring, pp. 73-104. 
 
Williamson O.E., (1985), The Economic Institutions of Capitalism, Free Press, New York. 
 
World Bank, (2001), Port Reform Toolkit, August. 
 
Zupan M.A., (1989), “Cable Franchise Renewals: Do Incumbent Firms Behave 
Opportunistically?”, Rand Journal of Economics, volume 20, pp. 473-482 
 36
